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‘We never recovered’: The Social Cost of the 1951 New Zealand Waterfront Dispute and 
Supporting Strikes 
 
In July 1951, 15,000 New Zealand watersiders, miners, freezing-workers and seamen returned to work 
after being locked-out or on strike, but their lives, and the lives of those dependent on their income, did 
not return to normal. For five months, most workers and their families had had to borrow money and 
leave bills unpaid in order to survive, and they needed to pay their debts. This article examines the social 
cost of the 1951 waterfront dispute. It concentrates on strike debt, and the long shadow that debt cast on 
family and community relationships. This article argues that many of the costs of an industrial dispute 
are not paid until after it ends, but in contrast to union’s collective concern about costs during the dispute, 
costs after the dispute are privatised and treated as the concern of individual families. 
 
 
In 1951, Maureen Martin’s husband, a Wellington freezing-worker, was on strike for five 
months. Forty-eight years later, she recorded an interview with her 13 year-old grandson 
and described the impact on her family: “We never recovered from that strike, as far as 
money goes because we had to pay back money to Jack’s mother that we had borrowed. 
See you were not paid a great wage in those days.”1 In July 1951, 15,000 watersiders, 
miners, freezing-workers and seamen returned to work after being locked-out or on 
strike, but their lives, and the lives of those dependent on their income, did not return to 
normal. For five months workers and their families had borrowed money and left bills 
unpaid in order to survive without wages. This article will discuss the on-going cost of 
the 1951 waterfront lockout and supporting strikes, and will argue that debt and hardship 
in the aftermath of strikes and lockouts are an integral part of  industrial struggle, which 
has received too little historical attention.  
The 1951 waterfront dispute was one of the largest New Zealand industrial 
disputes. From the end of World War II New Zealand ports were sites of intense conflict 
between management and labour.2 Due to the importance of the waterfront to the 
economy, the state was actively involved in managing industrial conflict on the 
waterfront. The conflict came to a head in February 1951 in a dispute over wages. The 
New Zealand Waterfront Workers Union (NZWWU) refused overtime, because they 
were unsatisfied with the pay rise employers had offered. Employers responded by 
refusing to hire any worker unless they agreed to overtime. The state took over the 
negotiations, set the conditions for watersiders to return to work and passed draconian 
regulations. The Waterfront Strike Emergency Regulations criminalised watersiders’ 
propaganda, marches and processions, and giving food or money to an NZWWU 
member.3 Approximately 7,000 miners, seamen and freezing workers went on strike in 
support of the watersiders and to oppose these regulations.4 The unions were defeated; at 
the beginning of July, workers returned to work on the government’s terms. In 
Confrontation ’51, Michael Bassett argued that the 1951 waterfront dispute helped make 
National the natural party of government for the next two decades.5 Bassett’s argument 
                                                 
1 Maureen Martin interview with Liam Martin, September 1999, Transcript, OHColl-0458, Oral History 
Centre, Alexander Turnbull Library (OHC-ATL). 
2 Anna Green, British Capital, Antipodean Labour: Working the New Zealand Waterfront, 1915-1951  (Dunedin: 
University of Otago Press, 2001). Post-war conflict on the waterfront was not limited to New Zealand, see 
Colin Davis, Waterfront Revolts: New York and London Dockworkers, 1946-61  (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2003); L. J. Louis and Les Louis, “The Cold/Class War, and the Jailing of Ted Roach,” Labour 
History, no. 86 (2004). 
3 ‘The Waterfront Strike Emergency Regulations 1951’, Statutory Regulations 1951, Wellington, 1951, 65-73. 
4 ‘Department of Labour Final Return of Strike or Industrial Dispute’, 1951, AANK-W3285-7, Archives 
New Zealand (ANZ). 
5 Michael Bassett, Confrontation ‘51: The 1951 Waterfront Dispute (Wellington: Reed, 1972), 212. 
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has had traction among other scholars.6 Historians have also discussed the industrial 
effects of 1951: Christine Meade described waterside workers’ long struggle to regain 
national unity; Pat Walsh examined the legacy of 1951 for the arbitration system and 
Cybele Locke discussed the role that activists who had been involved in the dispute 
played in other parts of the union movement.7 Melanie Nolan argued that the reliance on 
other family members’ income during the dispute and the defeat of the NZWWU 
weakened the breadwinner wage system.8 The legacy of the dispute in parliament, trades 
halls and workplaces has been covered, but its aftermath in homes and communities has 
received little historical attention. 
More widely, labour historians have considered the industrial effects of strikes 
and lockouts as integral to their history, but rarely made the same arguments about the 
social effects. David Camfield presented the rationale for this approach in his assessment 
of a recent Canadian health workers’ strike: “A central question in any assessment of the 
HEU strike is what it represented for the working-class movement”.1 Since 2006, fifteen 
articles in Labour History have focused on strikes or lockouts. Most of them do not 
discuss the aftermath, and if they mention it at all they focus on the industrial legacy.9 
When historians have addressed the social costs of an industrial dispute, they have done 
so in ways that underscore the marginalised nature of those questions. For example, 
Steven Thompson and Sue Bruley both noted that financial stress in mining communities 
in the 1926 miners’ lockout in the UK was exacerbated because many families had not 
repaid their debts from the 1921 lockout, but historians have not treated debt from the 
                                                 
6 Robert Chapman, “From Labour to National,” in The Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. W. H. Oliver 
(Wellington: Oxford University Press, 1981); Barry Gustafson, “The National Governments and Social 
Change (1949-1972),” in The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand, ed. Keith Sinclair (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1990); Tom Brooking, The History of New Zealand  (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004).  
7 Christine Meade, “New Zealand Waterfront Unions, 1951-1967: A Study of the Repercussions of the 
1951 Strike on the Wharf Unionists, and of Union Organisation from the Defeat of the N.Z.W.W.U. Until 
the Formation of the New Zealand Federation of Watersiders,” (MA, University of Otago, 1980); Pat 
Walsh, “The Legacy of ‘51,” in The Big Blue: Snapshots of the 1951 Waterfront Lockout, ed. David Grant 
(Christchurch: Canterbury, 2004); Cybèle  Locke, Workers in the Margins: Union Radicals in Post-War New 
Zealand  (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2012). 36. 
8 Melanie Nolan, “‘The Women Were Bloody Marvellous’: 1951, Gender and New Zealand Industrial 
Relations,” Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, no. 16 (2003). 
9 Mark Westcott, “One of the Boys or the Common Good?: Workplace Activism in the NSW Branch of 
the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemens Associations,” Labour History, no. 91 (2006); John Tully, 
“‘Nothing but Rebels’: Union Sisters at the Sydney Rubber Works, 1918-42,” Labour History, no. 103 
(2012); Robert Tierney, “The New South Wales Railway Commissioners’ Strategic Pre-Planning for the 
Mass Strike of 1917,” Labour History, no. 98 (2010); Danielle Thornton, “‘We Have No Redress Unless We 
Strike’: Class, Gender and Activism in the Melbourne Tailoresses’ Strike, 1882-83,” Labour History, no. 96 
(2009); Judith Smart, “Respect Not Relief: Feminism, Guild Socialism and the Guild Hall Commune in 
Melbourne, 1917,” Labour History, no. 94 (2008); Michael Quinlan, “The Low Rumble of Informal Dissent: 
Shipboard Protests over Health and Safety in Australian Waters, 1790-1900,” Labour History, no. 102 
(2012); Rory O’Malley, “The Eclipse of Mateship: The ‘Wide Comb Dispute’ 1979-85,” Labour History, no. 
90 (2006); Patrick O’Leary and Peter Sheldon “Strategic Choices and Unintended Consequences: Employer 
Militancy in Victoria’s Meat Industry, 1986-93,” Labour History, no. 95 (2008); Ashley Lavelle, “Under 
Pressure: The Whitlam Labor Opposition and Class Struggle, 1967-72,” Labour History, no. 96 (2009); 
Charles Fahey and John Lack, “‘Silent Forms of Coercion’: Welfare Capitalism, State Labour Regulation 
and Collective Action at the Yarraville Sugar Refinery, 1890-1925,” Labour History, no. 101 (2011); Nick 
Dyrenfurth, “‘A Terrible Monster’: From Employers to Capitalists in the 1885-86 Melbourne Wharf 
Labourers’ Strike,” Labour History, no. 94 (2008); Sandra Cockfield, “Mobilising at the Workplace: State 
Regulation and Collective Action in Three Workplaces, 1900 to the 1920s,” Labour History, no. 93 (2007); 
Robert Bollard, “‘The Active Chorus’: The Great Strike of 1917 in Victoria,” Labour History, no. 90 (2006); 
David Baker, “A Tale of Two Towns: Industrial Pickets, Police Practices and Judicial Review,” Labour 
History, no. 95 (2008); Paul Robert Adams and Erik Eklund, “Representing Militancy: Photographs of the 
Broken Hill Industrial Disputes, 1908-20,” Labour History, no. 101 (2011).  
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1921 lockout as important in itself.10 Timothy Minchin’s article on the International 
Paper Company Strike of 1987-88 focused on the employer’s decision to permanently 
replace many workers and so he discussed the impact of unemployment on workers and 
their families.11 The social aftermath of strikes and lockouts has, at best, been on the 
periphery of their histories.  
 
 
Strike Debt 
For five months nearly 15,000 workers did not receive wages. The state estimated that, 
without considering overtime or special rates, watersiders would have earned an average 
of £180, seamen £200 and miners £220. In total, watersiders lost almost £1.5 million 
pounds.12 Historians have discussed how families survived; Michael Bassett described 
three strategies: other employment (for both watersiders and their family members), 
relief committees, and debt.13 This section will demonstrate that neither employment nor 
aid from relief committees were adequate substitutes for the wages families lost and that 
most families had to go into debt. 
Contrary to Bassett’s suggestion, large numbers of watersiders did not get other 
work.14 Union members, the press and the government all treated getting paid work 
during those months as a sign that a worker was withdrawing from the dispute.15 As a 
watersider’s child understood it: “I got the impression that if you took other work, you 
were a scab.”16 The chair of the Auckland branch told a union member who travelled to 
Taupō to start a business: “he left the Union during a critical time and if every man did 
this there would be no union”.17 Some workers did take other work, either because they 
received permission from the union due to exceptional circumstances, or because they 
withdrew from the dispute, but in most places this was an extremely rare survival 
strategy.18 Letters to the Auckland branch of the NZWWU from those seeking clearance 
to get other work suggest that debt was a more acceptable survival strategy than leaving 
the union.19  
                                                 
10 Sue Bruley, “The Politics of Food: Gender, Family, Community and Collective Feeding in South Wales 
in the General Strike and Miners’ Lockout of 1926,” Twentieth Century British History 18, no. 1 (2007): 63; 
Steven Thompson, “That Beautiful Summer of Severe Austerity: Health, Diet and the Working-Class 
Domestic Economy in South Wales in 1926,” The Welsh History Review 21, no. 3 (2003): 564. 
11 Timothy Minchin, “‘Labor’s Empty Gun’: Permanent Replacements and the International Paper 
Company Strike of 1987–88,” Labor History 47, no. 1 (2006): 30. 
12 Department of Labour, ‘Schedule of the Time and wages Lost workers Involved in Waterfront Dispute’, 
1951, AANK-W3285-7, ANZ. 
13 Bassett, Confrontation, 138-139. See also, Scott, 151 Days, 165-173. 
14 Bassett, Confrontation, 139.  Bassett footnotes this claim to an article in the Herald, but police sources 
demonstrate that they were the source for this article, and that it was untrue: Report of Dave Patterson, 
Wellington, 1 April 1951, ADMO-21007-W5595-25/9/20/12, ANZ. 
15 Minutes of Meeting of Unions Directly Involved in Waterfront Dispute, 13 June 1951, Box 1, Barnes 
Papers, Auckland University Library (AUL); Huntly Coalfields Oral History Project, OHC-ATL; ‘Many 
waterside strikers now in full-time jobs in various other industries’, 5 April 1951, Dominion, ADMO-21007-
25/9/20/6 Part 1; Report of Dave Patterson, Wellington, 1 April 1951, ADMO-21007- 25/9/20/12; 
Report of E.G. Ward, Lyttelton, 1 April 1951 and Report of Duncan Wilson, Oamaru, 31 March 1951, 
ADMO-21007-5/9/20/2 Part 1; Report Bluff, 2 May 1951, ADMO-21007-25/9/20/3, ANZ. 
16 Maureen Fairey interview with Grace Millar, 5 July 2010, interviews in this collection are in the author’s 
possession and will be deposited in the OHC-ATL. 
17 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive & Chairmen of Committees, 6 
April 1951, 94-106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL. 
18 For an example of how rare see, Report of E. G. Ward, Lyttelton, 1 April 1951, ADMO-21007-
25/9/20/2, Part 1, ANZ. 
19 See for example, NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Meeting of Executive & Chairmen of 
Committees, 21 April 1951, 5 June 1951, 94-106-11/01; N. Coole to R. Jones, 5 June 1951, 94-106-11/04, 
Roth Papers, ATL. 
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Families could receive some funding from union relief, but union’s funds were 
restricted. When the NZWWU was deregistered, the Public Trust confiscated £60,854 
from the NZWWU, two thirds from the national office funds and the rest from 
individual branches, which was a substantial attack on the union’s ability to fight the 
dispute.20 While the NZWWU national office did receive aid from overseas unions, 
transferring these funds was difficult in light of the emergency regulations.21 Branches did 
have other sources of funds, but the amount they collected – while substantial – in no 
way compensated for the loss of income. The Auckland branch spent an average of just 
15 shillings per family per week on relief.22 Dick Scott suggested that unions spent 
£150,000 on relief, but his figures include an overestimation of how much Australian 
money reached relief committees.23 However, even if Scott’s figures were accurate, 
£150,000 was only £10 per locked-out or striking worker for five months. Without 
overtime, watersiders earned £8/10 a week.24 While the amount donated was substantial, 
when divided among 15,000 workers it was inadequate to meet even the most basic 
needs.  
Locked-out and striking workers and their families did have other strategies 
available to them. There is substantial evidence that watersiders’ wives routinely got other 
work.25 However, women earned about half of what their husbands had.26 In addition, 
families received aid from neighbours and kin, hunted, and went without.27 But working-
class wages in 1951 were not high and there was not much give in a family budget. 
Families needed their gardens just to get by – gardens could not solve the problem of 
food for five months.28 However, grocers did not expect immediate payment to provide 
goods.29 Watersiders and their families did not need to go out and actively borrow 
money, which was one of the reasons that debt was such a widely used survival strategy. 
When Maureen Martin discussed her situation with her grocer, the grocer made it clear 
that many customers did not pay their bills on time.30 The files of SAC and Farmers 
                                                 
20 ‘Summary’, Department of Labour, appointment of a receiver, AANK-W3285-7, ANZ. 
21 Jim Healy, General Secretary Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia, To all branches and federal 
councillors, 24 July 1951, Box 1, Vault 156, Barnes Papers, AUL; Report of Detective Sergeant R. Jones, 
relative to: Edward Albert Napier – Vide Attached no. 3272, ADMO-21007-W5595/1-25/9/20, ANZ; 
Fred Rix interview with Nicola Lovett, 26 November 2011, 2010.130.1, Huntly Coalfields Museum. 
22 E. Williamson, Relief Committee Report, July 1951, 94-106-11/06, Roth Papers, ATL. 
23 Scott, 151 Days, 173.  Just over £20,000 was distributed from national office to the branches during the 
dispute, not the £50,000 Scott suggested, [Rough Accounts], New Zealand Waterside Workers Union, 
1951, 88-311, Hill Papers, ATL. 
24 Bassett, Confrontation, 68. 
25 Report of A. Johnston, Greymouth, 30 March 1951, ADMO-21007-W5595-25/9/20/13,  ANZ; Andrea 
Hotere, “The 1951 Waterfront Lockout in Port Chalmers,” (BA Hons thesis, University of Otago, 1989), 
92. 
26 Northern Taranaki, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago and Southland Cleaners, Caretakers, Lift 
Attendants and Watchmen Award 1950, 3 May 1950; New Zealand Clothing-Trade Employees Award 
1950, 8 September 1950, New Zealand Awards Agreements & c., made under the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act, Apprentices Act and the Labour Disputes Investigation Act, 1950, Vol. 50, 429, 1063. 
27 See, for example, Alison Pitt, interview with Jamie MacKay, 3 April 1992, OHInt-0020/17, OHC-ATL; 
Tom and Pat Gregory interview with Grace Millar, 20 December 2010; Joseph Kereopa interview with 
Jamie Mackay, 27 February 1992, OHInt-0020/07, OHC-ATL; Jenny Cameron [pseudonym] interview 
with Grace Millar, 17 April 2012. For more information see Grace Millar, ‘Families and the New Zealand 
1951Waterfront Dispute’, (PhD, Victoria University of Wellington, 2014). 
28 Kate Jordan, ‘Golden Weather Gardening: New Zealand Home Sections, 1945-1970’, (MA, University of 
Auckland, 2009), 59-62.  
29 See, Norah Holland, ‘Some Aspects of Home-Making’, (Master of Home Sciences thesis, University of 
Otago, 1950). 
30 Maureen Martin interview with Liam Martin, September 1999, Transcript, OHColl-0458/1, OHC-ATL. 
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show that some level of late payment of rent and hire purchase was normal.31 Families 
had to, and could, postpone paying some of their bills and therefore go into debt; locked-
out and striking workers could not get other work and the substantial sums union relief 
committees put together were inadequate to make up for lost wages. 
Debt, particularly debt incurred by not paying bills, was part of NZWWU’s 
strategy for workers’ survival. Union branches knew that their members were not paying 
all their bills and did not leave workers’ access to credit to chance. In 1949, during a 
short-lived dispute on the Auckland waterfront, the first action of the relief committee 
was to approach stores that offered hire purchase to their customers and ask for credit 
for watersiders.32 In 1951, the Auckland relief committee acted on behalf of union 
members in ensuring that state housing tenants would not be pushed for rent during the 
lockout.33 Decades later Johnny Mitchell, who was on the Auckland branch committee, 
could still remember the response he received:  
 
Farmers Trading Company as far as I can remember had a fairly 
good reputation, Smith and Brown was another one that were 
fairly liberal, the bad ones I can remember – Bond and Bond 
they weren’t very good, Nathan Brothers. […] There were a 
number of hire purchase firms that were quite compassionate to 
watersiders, there were one or two that were not very 
compassionate, but generally speaking we didn’t do too bad 
among those people.34 
 
On 13 June 1951, the Wellington branch of the NZWWU asked the Wellington City 
Council not to disconnect the electricity of union members who were behind on 
payments.35 This is further evidence that branches knew that a significant portion of their 
members were not paying their bills, and actively tried to organise credit.  
Oral histories about 1951 do not often directly discuss how people survive, but 
those that do suggest that credit was central.36 Maureen Martin’s grocer told her to order 
as normal and repay him afterwards.37 Russell French, a locked-out Wellington 
watersider, was living in a block of housing on Molesworth St in Wellington that was 
mostly rented to watersiders. When explaining how he survived he stated: “No one got 
put out of that place”.38 Ian Church, whose father was a locked-out watersider in Port 
                                                 
31 Legal - Summonses - Return of eviction orders for Minister of Housing, AELE-19203-SAC1/47-8.4.2, 
ANZ; Irvine Hire to Hire Purchase Department Farmers Trading Company, 4 June 1946; Mrs D. 
Johnstone to Farmers Trading Company, 16 December 1940, Box 7 (41), 91/37, Farmers Trading 
Company Papers, Auckland Museum. 
32 Auckland Lockout Minutes, 1949, 94-106-11/09, Roth Papers, ATL.  
33 NZWWU Auckland Branch, Minutes of Special Members Meeting, 6 March, 8 March, 14 May 1951, 94-
106-11/01, Roth Papers, ATL. 
34 John James Mitchell interview with Douglas Crosado, Ray Grover and Bert Roth, 1977-1988, OHInt-
0219/1, OHC-ATL. Oral histories of Wellington relief committee members include similar accounts: 
Trade Union History Project, ‘A Dissenting New Zealand: a Seminar on the Life of Rona Bailey’, 
December 1993, audio recording, OHC-01451;Ted Thompson interview with Cath Kelly, 1990, OhInt-
0112/3, OHC-ATL. 
35 Unfortunately no further information, such as how many members were behind on their bills is available. 
General Meeting of the Council, 13 June 1951, Wellington City Council Minute Books, Volume 59, 
00166:0:57, Wellington City Archives. 
36 There are over 50 oral history interviews with people who were involved in the dispute in the ATL, 
smaller collections in the Huntly Museum and in private hands, and I completed a project of 20 interviews 
for this research. However, few of these interviews discuss how families survived directly; I have used the 
interviews that do in this discussion.  
37 Maureen Martin interview with Liam Martin, September 1999, Transcript, OHColl-0458/1, OHC-ATL. 
38 Russell French interview with Grace Millar, 6 January 2011. 
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Chalmers, emphasised this point: “Anyone in Port will tell you that the local grocer and 
butcher carried a lot of people through ‘51. So there were often quite large bills owing.”39 
Kevin Ford described his father, a Bluff Watersider, telling him that half the port was 
carried by their local grocer.40 In their oral histories, interviewees do not just talk about 
their own use of credit, but also indicate that credit was a standard survival strategy.  
Oral history evidence from those who described themselves as not going into 
debt reinforces the importance of credit for most families. Throughout his interview 
Tom Gregory emphasised that he did not believe in debt, had never gone into debt, and 
contrasted his behaviour with other people he knew who put goods on hire purchase; he 
presented not going into debt as part of his identity. However, he said that his landlady 
had told him that they should only pay their rent when they could.41 So even though he 
did not classify it as debt, his landlady’s credit was central to his family’s survival. The 
only evidence from a family that appears not to have gone into debt at all comes from 
interviews with Ted and Ida Thompson.42 Their mortgage payments were not large, Ida 
took paid work, they received money from Ida’s parents, food from their neighbours and 
they spent all their savings.43 Their experience demonstrates the range of resources 
required to avoid debt. 
The institutions that extended credit have not left archival records of this debt. 
Small institutions, such as landlords and grocers, have not deposited their records in 
archives.44 The State Advances Corporation (SAC) ran state housing and does have 
archives; these do not directly address the dispute, but do demonstrate the normal 
practice of SAC around rent arrears and evictions. 45 An eviction for unpaid rent was a 
serious step for SAC to take – it required the written permission of the Minister of the 
time, Jack Marshall.46 In the 1949 calendar year, only nine people were evicted from state 
houses.47 One woman owed £78/12/0; she was 39 weeks behind on the rent. In court 
she agreed to pay it back at a rate of five shillings a week, an agreement she kept to ‘fairly 
regularly’ according to SAC staff, and this was enough for her to avoid eviction.48 While 
SAC sources cannot provide information on how many watersiders went into debt, it can 
demonstrate that watersiders could go into debt by not paying their rent without being 
evicted.  
Definitive information about how many workers used debt during the dispute is 
not available, however all the evidence that is available suggests that going into debt was 
widespread, and paying off debt after 1951 was a common experience for those who 
went on strike or were locked out. Other funding to make up for the massive hole in 
family budgets was inadequate and union sources indicate that credit was an active union 
strategy for survival. Oral histories further suggest that credit was a normal way of coping 
and relatively easy to obtain. The relative ease with which working-class families accessed 
                                                 
39 Ian Church, interview with Grace Millar, 11 February 2011. 
40 Kevin Ford interview with Grace Millar, 13 February 2011. 
41 Tom and Pat Gregory interview with Grace Millar, 20 December 2010. 
42 As many of those interviewed did not directly address how they survived, for many of the interviews it is 
impossible to tell whether the interviewee went into debt or not.  
43 Ted Thompson and Ida Thompson interviews with Cath Kelly, 1990, OhInt-0112/3; Ida Thompson 
interview with Kerry Taylor, 1995, Ted Thompson interview with Kerry Taylor, 1995, OHColl-0861, 
OHC-ATL. 
44 I have searched the ATL for relevant archives.  I have also made special inquiries of the libraries in port 
towns. 
45 See the following files: AELE-19207-SAC10-5; AELE-19203-SAC1/47-8.4.2; AELE-19203-SAC1 
17/5/76/1-Part 2, ANZ.  
46 Circular S.A.C., 1951/26, 17 July 1951, AELE-1927-SAC10-5, ANZ. 
47 ‘Memorandum for Minister for State Advances’, 6 August 1950, AELE-19203-SAC1/47-8.4.2, ANZ. 
48 Memorandum, SAC of New Zealand Auckland Office, 4 August 1950, AELE-19203-SAC1/47-8.4.2, 
ANZ. 
7 
 
credit is also shown in institutional records. While there is not enough evidence to be 
certain about the exact number of people involved – all the available evidence suggests 
that it was a majority experience. 
Many individuals, companies and institutions lent money to locked-out and 
striking workers, but most of them have left no records. The best record for the size of 
workers’ debt is the Seamen’s union records. Striking seamen were in a different position 
from other locked-out and striking workers. When seamen went on strike and left their 
ships, they were walking away from their beds and they were carrying the wages from 
their latest voyage.49 The Seamen’s Union called on members who had savings to lend 
that money to the relief effort and paid Post Office Savings Bank rates of interest. Then 
the union lent this money to members who needed relief at the same interest rate.50 The 
Seamen’s Union Records contain a repayment book from Auckland. R. Blackburn 
recorded the highest repayments; he repaid £40, which was six weeks to two months of a 
seaman’s wage.51 Other seamen repaid significant amounts: 22 individuals repaid more 
than £20, 46 between £10 and £20, and just over a hundred repaid less than £10.52 These 
records are partial, but give a sense of how substantial some workers’ debts were, 
particularly when compared to their income. They also show how varied the size of 
workers’ debt was, and their ability to pay it off. 
The typical size of a bill that went unpaid is the other best source for families’ 
level of debt by July 1951. In 1951, SAC rent for a five room house was between 
£1/14/0 and £2/3/6 per week.53 A family that had been unable to pay rent of £2 per 
week during the dispute would owe £40 by July, which was the equivalent of 5 weeks’ 
wages.54 N. Coole, an Auckland watersider, had hire purchase payments of £2/17/0; if 
he did not pay this for the duration of the dispute then he would owe £57, plus interest, 
which would have been two months’ wages.55 The Seamen’s Union files demonstrate, 
and the size of bills that were left unpaid suggest, that many workers’ owed more than 
they could earn in a month as a result of the dispute. 
 
 
Repaying Debt 
There are even fewer sources on repaying debt than on the level of families’ debt in the 
first place and the same mixture of archival and oral history sources are the only way to 
reconstruct how debt shaped families’ lives. The first hurdle for most watersiders in 
repaying their debt from the lockout was finding new work. The government won the 
                                                 
49 For example, Keith Roberts interview with Grace Millar, 19 June 2011. 
50 ‘Statement made by Frederick Charles O’Connor’, 9 July 1951, AANK-W32853-7, ANZ; Minutes of 
Lyttelton Seamen’s Union Special Meeting, 17 April 1951, Box 26, D-8, Seamen’s Union Auckland Branch 
records, AUL. 
51 Auckland Seamen’s Strike Committee - Financial records, 80-307-22/03, New Zealand Seamen’s Union 
Records, ATL; New Zealand Seamen Award, 16 December 1950, New Zealand Awards Agreements & c., made 
under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, Apprentices Act and the Labour Disputes Investigation Act, 1950, 
Vol.50, 3651. 
52 Auckland Seamen’s Strike Committee - Financial records, 80-307-22/03, New Zealand Seamen’s Union 
Records, ATL. 
53 ‘State housing new and old – increase of rental charges’ Appendix to head office circular memorandum, 
31 March 1950, AELE-19203-SAC1/189-35.88-Part 2, ANZ. 
54 For examples, Wellington City Council Labourers Award, 13 September 1950, New Zealand Awards 
Agreements & c., made under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, Apprentices Act and the Labour Disputes 
Investigation Act, 1950, Vol.50, 1382-3; New Zealand (except Westland and Canterbury) General 
Warehousemen (other than soft-goods) Amendment of Award, 12 April 1949, New Zealand Awards 
Agreements & c., made under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, Apprentices Act and the Labour Disputes 
Investigation Act, 1949, Vol.49, 1261.  
55 N. Coole to R. Jones, 5 June 1951, 94-106-11/04, Roth Papers, ATL. 
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dispute by finding replacement waterfront workers. Only 2,200 former members of the 
union returned to work on the wharf after the dispute was over; the other 6,200 had to 
find other work.56 Access to employment on the wharf after the dispute varied 
significantly between ports; in Auckland existing watersiders were very effectively 
blacklisted from the waterfront for life, on the West Coast all watersiders returned to 
their jobs.57 Unemployment was very low in 1951; most workers found other work easily 
and many employers could not afford to black-list workers who had been involved in the 
dispute. Three groups of workers were vulnerable to blacklisting: those in small ports, 
those who took leadership positions during the dispute, and those seeking work in a 
small industry. These workers had to move, or start a small business in order to get new 
employment.58 The impact of having to find new work was unevenly distributed. Many 
workers were not able to earn as much money in their new jobs as they had previously, 
as other industries did not have the same level of overtime. For example, Ian Church’s 
father, who had been a Port Chalmers watersider, took work as a foreman at the dry 
dock in after the dispute, but Maureen Fairey’s father, who had been an Auckland 
watersider, never again earned as much as he had on the waterfront.59 One watersider 
described his new work situation succinctly: “I went to a worse job, with worse 
conditions and less pay”.60  
Other family members’ had their pattern of work affected by the stress of 
repaying family debt, particularly young adults who had not yet left school. Yvonne 
Grove had hoped to go to university, but in 1954 she had to leave school and find work: 
“I knew if I could go to work it would bring some money into the house”.61 Her father 
was Toby Hill who had been the Secretary of the NZWWU and had been blacklisted. 
Marilyn Bowman and Bruce Malcolm, whose fathers were both watersiders, also 
described giving up their dreams of university to start paid work, because of their 
families’ financial situation. 62 Some women who had taken up paid work as a short-term 
strategy during the dispute continued because of their family’s financial position. 
Maureen Fairey remembered her father, who was an Auckland watersider, arguing that 
no wife of his would ever take paid work, but financial necessity changed his mind. 
Fairey’s mother had to take paid work during the lockout, and continued this work 
afterwards. She resented having to do paid work, and resented her husband for not 
earning enough money in his new job, but it was her decision that paid work was a better 
option than not having that income.63 Ida Thompson also continued her work as a 
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cleaner after the dispute. She described her decision to do so in terms of the dispute: it 
had depleted the couple’s savings and she was doing her part to build them up again. 64  
Debt affected families for many years after the dispute, because it took so long to 
repay. The best evidence of the history of debt repayment is from the Seamen’s Union. 
Twelve debtors have a payment marked “final payment” in the Seamen’s Union receipt 
book. The first seaman to repay that debt in full was J. Devitt; he paid off the last of his 
debt in October 1952.65 Five other seamen repaid their debt in full in 1952. The next 
final payment occurred in 1955 and three people made their last payment in the 1960s. J. 
Stevens was the last to repay his debt in these records, in April 1964.66 Seamen were not 
representative of other workers involved in the dispute, as their debt was to the union 
and they were paid wages on leaving a ship, rather than weekly. However, these 
differences made seamen more able and motivated to pay off debt, not less. Seamen were 
certainly not the only people repaying debt accumulated during the dispute into the 
1960s.  
Scant evidence survives about families and individuals failing to repay strike debt. 
Evidence from the dispute suggests that eviction and repossession were used rarely if at 
all, in those five months.67 Bankruptcy, mortgagee and other public records of debt 
defaulting are difficult to connect to the dispute. The high turnover of workers on the 
waterfront at the end of the lockout means that most of those who described themselves 
as watersiders in 1952 or 1953 would not have been working on the wharves in 1951. 
However, isolated evidence of people suffering significant losses due to their inability to 
repay debt does exist. Jimmy Hewitt, a Wellington watersider, described losing a deposit 
on a house during the dispute.68 Mr R. Cecil had been an Auckland watersider and he was 
served eviction papers in July 1953. He had been behind on his rent since the dispute, 
and had had another period of unemployment when his wife died and he had to care for 
his children.69 He was still in debt and fighting eviction two years after the dispute ended.  
Few adults, even those who go into detail about what they owed, talk about the 
process of repaying debt, or how long it took, but children’s accounts give a glimpse into 
how their family life changed once their parents had paid off their debt. Two men who 
were boys during the dispute tell very similar stories of a time when the debt was paid 
off. Kevin Ford said: “Things started to pick up a bit. That’s when we started to go to 
the movies – I know that – we never went to the movies while… for years. Then all of a 
sudden we were going the movies.”70 William Dougherty, whose father was a watersider 
in Port Chalmers, also talked about only being able to go to movies when he was older.71 
Their stories stand as acknowledgement that the point where debt was paid off existed, 
and made a significant difference to the economic lives of families 
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The Social Meaning of Debt 
Debt shaped relationships where credit had been extended and accepted. In 2011, David 
Dick, the son of a locked-out watersider in Port Chalmers, was completely committed to 
using local shops, rather than shopping in Dunedin, because local shops had extended 
credit sixty years earlier.72 Kevin Ford described buying groceries from another grocer a 
decade after the dispute, and his father’s reaction:  
 
Mum said “no Kevin got these from the grocery store on the 
wharf. They’re a lot cheaper than Charlie Denny” – that was our 
grocer – and Dad took one look at me one look at my mother, 
picked them up and he said come follow me. I followed them out 
and he threw them in the rubbish bin and he said that if I bring 
anything home like that again I’ll be put in the rubbish bin and 
I’ll be out the gate. He said ‘the grocer carried me for three 
months and half them bastards down there and they started a 
store up against him’. He wasn’t a very happy chappy.73 
 
This incident happened in the 1960s. Debt and credit extended during industrial disputes 
shaped social and commercial relationships within working-class communities for 
decades. 
Working-class people’s identity and sense of self could be tied up with the way 
they managed debt. Johnny Mitchell saw his wife’s commitment to repaying debt as part 
of her character: 
 
[The grocer] gave us credit right through, and he always bragged 
that it was the Mitchell family who always paid their bill at the 
end of the dispute, some of them didn’t, but Lorna paid up every 
penny that he gave us credit for. 
 
[Interviewer: it’s essential that a man can hold his head up high 
for everything.] 
 
Yes, Lorna was that kind of person.74 
 
As has already been discussed, Tom Gregory identified as someone who never went into 
debt even though his landlady gave him credit during the dispute.75 Gregory and Mitchell 
were both comfortable with the way their family had managed debt and the dispute and 
discussed it with some pride and satisfaction. Maureen Fairey showed the other side of 
this pride in her interview. Fairey was aware that her parents had gone into debt, because 
her mother told her about it: “She told me that at the end of the six months or so she 
said we had absolutely nothing and we were in debt.”76 Debt contributed to on-going 
bitterness within her family: “And my mother was a very proud woman, it would have 
really made her very angry. But she said to me that my father never really went without 
too much you know – it was her – and she had to make do for us kids really.”77 Here 
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Fairey links the debt, her mother’s emotional response to the debt, and conflict within 
her parents’ relationship. In order to talk about the 1951 waterfront dispute, Fairey has to 
explore the relationships within her family, which underscores the importance of 
industrial conflict in shaping her family’s life.  
 
Class-Consciousness and Family Strike Debt 
Examining the social and economic cost of strike debt also gives a much wider 
understanding of David Camfield’s question; what does a strike mean for the working 
class movement? Elizabeth Faue argued that the family is where people first experience 
class.78 A significant industrial conflict like the 1951 waterfront dispute shaped how the 
participants and their families experienced class. One of the reasons that it is difficult to 
uncover the role of the family in class consciousness is that it may be the first place 
people experience class, but it is not the last. I interviewed thirteen children whose 
fathers were locked out and on strike; they were in their 60s and 70s. How they discussed 
the impact 1951 had on their family, how they understood 1951, and how they 
articulated class in their interviews were all affected by the events of 1951, but they were 
also affected by their different experiences over the following 60 years. Four of the men I 
interviewed had followed their fathers and spent the bulk of their working life on the 
waterfront.79 The way these men talked about the lockout reflected that, like their fathers, 
they had a conception of class and industrial disputes shaped around decades of wharf 
work. For example, Kevin Ford, who was still working on the Timaru waterfront when I 
interviewed him, had clearly absorbed his father’s message about debt, responsibility and 
industrial disputes.80  
Maureen Martin’s interview, from which this article gets its name, provides a way 
of exploring in more detail how 1951 affected class consciousness within a family. In her 
relatively short interview with her grandson she recalled her experiences as the wife of a 
freezing worker. This interview was archived in the Alexander Turnbull Library alongside 
an interview between Martin and her daughter-in-law Pip Desmond about the depression 
(Desmond intended to interview Martin about 1951, but was not able to do so before her 
death).81 Martin’s grandson had grown up in a very different world from the one his 
grandmother described. His father had been the first in his family to go to university, so 
his family’s class position was very different from Martin’s experience.82 In addition, the 
interview took place in the context of seven years of successive governments dismantling 
the post-war welfare-state consensus, and weakening unions.83 Martin uses her narrative 
of 1951 to ensure her grandson has an awareness of the struggles she was part of, and 
the world view that sustained them. She explains solidarity and ensures her grandson is 
aware of her support of the strike, particularly when it comes to the importance of not 
crossing a picket line. When her grandson asks if it ever looked as if her husband was 
going to have to go back to work, she replied: “Oh no, you would never stop the strike, 
no, no good heavens, I’d have left him. You know what the name is for someone who 
stops the strike don’t you? – a scab.”84 Here she is asserting her own class-consciousness 
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– and using the narrative to ensure that her grandson understands the importance of 
never being a scab. Martin used narratives about 1951 to communicate her understanding 
of working-class values and behaviour to her family members, just as Kevin Ford’s father 
had.  
Within Martin’s family 1951 could not just function as an exemplary narrative; its 
economic legacy was too significant. As quoted in the introduction, the debt from 1951 
was not something that her family recovered from. Martin explains what steps they took 
in order to avoid another catastrophe: “he got his job back and the company wanted him 
to join the staff, which meant if there was ever another strike he could stay with the 
company and get paid, he didn’t go out, and he felt he had done his share, so he did 
join.”85 Although she is using the narrative of the dispute to raise class consciousness in 
her grandson, as a result of 1951 her husband decided to actively change his class 
position, so he would not suffer the same hardship again. Martin’s interview with her 
grandson shows some of the complex and hard to access legacies of 1951 for the 
working-class movement. For those involved, 1951 existed as a story and a legacy, and an 
economic reality that had to be managed.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has shown that for most families the 1951 waterfront dispute did not end in 
July, but just entered a new phase, as it still had to be paid for. During the dispute family 
finances were a concern for the whole branch, as they could drive a watersider to work as 
a strikebreaker. In the first week of July 1951, the Auckland relief committee wrote a 
report of their work so far, and included a discussion of how they saw their role if the 
dispute continued: 
 
If dispute concludes on Friday as suggested by Mr. Drennan 
there will be an approximate period of three weeks for the 
rehabilitation of members costs will be in the same proportion as 
goods will be more plentiful and members unable to obtain work 
are entitled to a fuller ration than previous. On that basis a sum 
of approximately £4,000 will be required as credit firms, 
landlords, etc. will expect and demand full payment of 
commitments and not on a meagre, partial basis as at present.86 
 
This statement is one of the few union sources that acknowledged that the effects of the 
conflict would last beyond its official end. Once the dispute ended, individual families’ 
financial positions were no longer a collective union concern. In fact, the Seamen’s 
Union became a creditor on its members. During the 151 days watersiders were locked 
out, the costs of the dispute were a collective responsibility, but at the end of the dispute, 
responsibilities that had been collective reverted to individual families. Relief 
organisations continued to exist for a few weeks, but then families’ survival was pushed 
back behind closed doors.  
Noting that strikes and lockouts were paid for by debt is not a new observation. 
While discussion of the aftermath of strikes and lockouts is rare, as shown in the 
introduction, historians have described the use of debt by striking workers and their 
families. However, historians have only very briefly discussed the impact of strike debt 
                                                 
85 ibid. Martin’s family was not the only to make this decision; Charles Bullock became a mining deputy so 
that he would not have to go on strike again, Cora and Charles Bullock interview with Jamie Mackay, 23 
March 1992, OHInt-0020/13, OHC-ATL. 
86 ‘ Report’, Relief Committee, New Zealand Waterside Workers’ Union (Auckland Branch), 94-106-11/06, 
Roth Papers, ATL. 
13 
 
on families and communities. Labour historians have often marginalised the aftermath of 
industrial disputes. In doing so, they have implicitly accepted that the consequences of a 
dispute were the concerns of individuals and families, not history. Prolonged lockouts 
and strikes have an impact on people and communities that last long after all the workers 
have returned to work, and if histories of industrial disputes ignore that they reinforce 
the privatisation of costs after a dispute.  
 
